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Abstract
Recent theoretical progress in nonequilibrium thermodynamics, link-
ing the physical principle of Maximum Entropy Production (“MEP”) to
the information-theoretical “MaxEnt” principle of scientific inference, to-
gether with conjectures from theoretical physics that there may be no
fundamental causal laws but only probabilities for physical processes, and
from evolutionary theory that biological systems expand “the adjacent
possible” as rapidly as possible, all lend credence to the proposition that
probability should be recognized as a fundamental physical motive. It is
further proposed that spatial order and temporal order are two aspects of
the same thing, and that this is the essence of the second law of thermo-
dynamics.
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order, temporal order, evolution.
PACS codes: 05.70.Ln, 65.40.Gr, 01.70.+w, 02.50.-r, 89.70.+c
1 Introduction
“Because that’s where the money is.” According to legend from America’s 1930s
era of economic depression and gangsters, that was the pithy response of the
notorious outlaw and jail-breaker John Dillinger to the question, “Why do you
rob banks?” It’s a catchy wise crack (albeit referring to reckless and foolhardy
behavior), as it boldly suggests an amusingly simple alternative view of action,
or of motivation—a view perhaps not anticipated by the question as posed.
It is a view which implicitly presumes possibility rather than necessity, in a
figure-ground perceptual switch, from recognition of that which is prescribed by
familiar rules, to recognition of that which has not been ruled out. It is a switch
from explanation as prior cause (“efficient cause”) to explanation as attraction
(“final cause”) (Salthe 2004).
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The significance of what I have called a figure-ground perceptual switch must
be appreciated, since the point of this letter is to suggest a sort of inverted view
of “motive”, that is, what we accept as an explanation for the course of events.
It seems to be a natural habit of human cognition, when presented with a
perceptual field of any sort, to distinguish some figure from some complementary
ground. For example, we have all seen certain black and white images with which
we may experience a perceptual switch as we swap what we recognize as figure
with what we recognize as ground. Similarly, certain composers have created
such effects musically, so that the listener may experience a perceptual switch
as to which voices carry the figure melody and which stand as the background
harmony.
Such considerations may seem to be of little relevance to objective science,
but I suggest otherwise. For example, in mathematics, proofs by reductio ad
absurdum are commonly employed; in this case the problem is more tractable
when approached with a sort of inverted view: one supposes the logical comple-
ment of what one wishes to prove, and derives a contradiction, which implies
that the complement of the (complementary) supposition must be the case. In
electronics, it is customary to think of circuits in terms of applied voltages as
the “background” and resulting currents as the figures of interest. Perhaps this
is so because voltage sources, such as batteries, are more commonly encountered
than current sources. But both analysis and design can sometimes be facilitated
by a perceptual switch, thinking of currents as “ground” and resulting voltages
as figures of interest. Then, for example, one speaks of a resistor “generating”
a voltage, by virtue of the current flowing through it. In theoretical physics,
figure-ground inversions of point of view have been fruitfully assumed with re-
spect to the priority of particle or field, where initially a particle (by its charge
or mass) was thought to produce a field, but later the idea arose that “particles”
were actually effects of fields.
In general, science is like puzzle-building, proceeding as far as possible from
one direction, then continuing from another direction. Impasses provide the
signal, not that nature is essentially paradoxical, but that the explanatory power
of the current direction of work, of the model used to explain nature, has been
exhausted. I suggest that we have reached such a point with the very model of
causal motives as explanations for physical processes, and that the second law
of thermodynamics was the first signal, the statistical foundations of quantum
mechanics the second signal. Heretofore, causality has been the figure of interest
seen to be operating against a background of uncertainty; now perhaps we
should take the inverted view and accept uncertainty, or extent of possibilities,
as a physical motive, in the sense that it may account for physical processes
with logical economy and without reference to a particular observer.
So the folk story of John Dillinger is taken as a jumping-off point for an
argument in favor of an alternative model of physical motive in science, the
logical antecedent of which is the second law of thermodynamics and Carnot’s
seminal observation that “wherever there exists a difference of temperature,
motive force can be produced” (Carnot 1977). Carnot’s observation is echoed
by George Spencer-Brown’s statement, on the foundations of logic: “There can
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be no distinction without motive, and there can be no motive unless contents
are seen to differ in value” (Spencer-Brown 1969). The role of distinction, or
difference, in both physical and mental processes, is so implicit as to be ignored,
yet it should be recognized as the most fundamental concept in our models of
dynamics. Carnot could as well have said that where a difference of height
exists (e.g. hydraulic head), motive force can be produced, or that where a
difference of wind speed exists, motive force can be produced. A generalization
of Carnot’s statement of the second law of thermodynamics is that wherever a
difference exists, a motive force also exists, in the form of the probability that
the difference will evolve toward equilibrium.
I equate differences, in the foregoing broad sense, with improbability, because
there are fewer “easy” (low-energy) ways that states of difference can be realized
than states of indifference can be realized. Hence “probability”, as used in
speaking of “probability as a physical motive”, is supposed to be a measure
of opportunities for change of state. In this sense probability refers more to
phase-space volume than to either ratios of outcomes derived from sampling or
to any observer’s degree of certainty as to present or future state.
The proposal is not that this probability should somehow be sensible to a
system, so as to operate as a familiar causal motive (as one might understand
“pulling” in terms of the front face of a hook pushing on the back face of a hitch);
rather the proposal is that this probability might be recognized as a motive per
se, insofar as it describes the correlations between observed states. Given the
habit of insistence on proximate, causal explanation, to assume this view may
require what I have called a figure-ground perceptual switch. But such a view
is no more strange than the natural expectation that ripples on the surface of a
pond should spread outward.
Understanding that any difference or gradient inheres the potential to pro-
duce motive force and vice versa facilitates the understanding of such phenom-
ena as, for example, the flight of albatrosses, which utilize the potential available
in wind shear to stay aloft, or the formation of placer deposits, where stream
flow effectively differentiates alluvium according to density. Thus distinction
(difference, or gradient) and motive are reciprocally dependent, and this mo-
tive, arising from the possibility of change (or “flow”) toward equilibrium, is
indeed the most fundamental physical motive.
What is proposed here is not a scientific theory or hypothesis in the Pop-
perian sense, but a geometric conceptual model of notions of spatial order and
temporal order (i.e. evolution), inspired by such useful principles as that of
Maximum Entropy Production (see, for example, (Kleidon & Lorenz 2005))
and “MaxEnt” (Jaynes 1957, Dewar 2005), and by the idea that probability fig-
ures more fundamentally than causality in theoretical physics (Anandan 2003).
The evolution of life and biological diversification seem particularly persuasive
that “nature loves opportunities”, leading to Kauffman’s conjecture that living
systems “expand the dimensionality of the adjacent possible as rapidly as pos-
sible” (Kauffman 2000). By this it is meant that evolution proceeds in such a
way as to maximize the number of directions in which life might continue to
evolve—which can be interpreted as another sort of maximum-entropy principle
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when entropy is understood as a measure of “spread”. The aim of this letter is
to synthesize disparate conceptual models of dynamics and to contribute to the
conceptual foundations of scientific inquiry and theory in this area.
2 Explanation in Science
One might suspect that the Dillinger character resonated with popular imagi-
nation because he represented a sort of subversive freedom at a time when most
people’s experience was dominated by severe economic constraints and scarcity
of opportunities. But the idea suggests itself, after the “because that’s where
the money is” remark, that a similar figure-ground perceptual switch might of-
ten be appropriate in science, as the ultimate aim is to explain what we observe
as simply and as generally as possible, not as properly as possible. It has often
been observed that traditions of scientific viewpoint define the questions that
are asked as well as the form of hypotheses that are entertained. The suggestion
here is that it may sometimes be possible to simplify the understanding of na-
ture by revising one’s viewpoint, perhaps even to see exceptions as rules. Such a
figure-ground perceptual switch is justifiable if it leads to logical economy—fewer
primitive concepts and relations accounting for more observations—regardless
whether it conforms to the traditional, familiar view.
It may be just as useful to presume that nature moves toward opportunities,
as it is to presume that nature is strictly compelled by causal laws. As a natural-
ist, one is more impressed by nature’s opportunism than by its competitiveness.
Over sixty years ago Schro¨dinger remarked that “physical laws rest on atomic
statistics and are therefore only approximate” (Schro¨dinger 1944). More re-
cently Anandan has argued that “there are no fundamental causal laws but only
probabilities for physical processes” (Anandan 2003). Given that these proba-
bilities are at least invariant with respect to different observers, and that they
lead to correct predictions, perhaps it is appropriate to recognize these probabil-
ities as the physical motive that explains change (i.e. evolution of state). With
such a view, one does not expect some sort of retroactive causal motive, nor
any “sense” on the part of physical systems about their possible future; rather
one identifies the field of possibilities itself as the motive for change.
The opening line was intended to introduce the idea that nature has an
“outlaw” character, which is not to say that nature is haphazard, ergodic, or
entirely unruly. The outlaw character of nature is the ground that essentially
complements its “law abiding” character, which has been the figure of interest
for centuries of modern science in pursuit of mechanistic causal explanation.
In Solomonoff’s and Chaitin’s formal developments of inductive inference based
on algorithmic information theory (Solomonoff 1964, Chaitin 1974), a law, as
a symbolic string, is essentially a summary of many “observation” strings. In
this scheme, a law can be thought of as the shortest computer program capable
of generating all those other strings which encode observations to which the
law pertains (and it would not generate any strings representing contrary ob-
servations). Thus the correlations between observations are explicitly taken as
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the substance of laws. Laws, as symbolic strings, are summaries that describe
correlations rather than exhibiting them. In information theory, such “decor-
relation” is one of the steps of information compression. Explanation then can
be considered to be information compression; always correlative but not nec-
essarily causal, it is time-neutral. For there is no requirement that only those
correlations with the proper temporal relation be admitted for summary. Even
if the world were such that future events determined past events, the correla-
tions could be summarized as laws, which might be considered as the reasons,
or motives, for sequences of events. The second law of thermodynamics is of
this nature: describing what we expect to observe in the evolution of systems,
it does not appear to explain the “cause” that would motivate such behavior,
but it summarizes correlations between observations.
3 The second law of thermodynamics, macrostate
and microstate
The laws of science describe patterns and rhythms that are observed in nature
(Feynman 1967), as relations between objects. The statistical tendency for
differences to equilibrate, for the improbable to lead to the probable, is one such
recurrent, reproducible pattern, whether the interpretation be phenomenological
or epistemological. I allude to the controversy regarding the interpretation of
entropy objectively (for example, (Denbigh & Denbigh 1985)) vs. subjectively
(for example, (Jaynes 1965)).
The work of Clausius, Maxwell, Boltzmann, and Gibbs in statistical mechan-
ics was motivated by the desire to provide a mechanistic basis for understanding
thermodynamics, and in particular for understanding such notions as that of en-
tropy, in terms of the details of molecular motions. The second law appears a
bit peculiar in comparison to other physical laws, in that it refers not to individ-
ual objects but to systems: collections of objects together with their relations.
Moreover, as Gibbs observed, in statistical mechanics one takes a broader view
of systems, by concerning oneself not simply with the evolution of given systems,
but with the evolution of given distributions of systems (Gibbs 1902). Hence the
idea of a macrostate, as an ensemble of consistent microstates. The microstates
may differ in microscopic detail, but they are indistinguishable macroscopically
in terms of the chosen system parameters (such as temperature, pressure, etc.,
which are typically averages).
There appears again something of a controversy regarding the matter of
reconciling time-symmetric dynamics and time-asymmetric thermodynamics.
The above-mentioned approach, distinguishing more or less arbitrarily between
macrostate and microstate, is sometimes called “coarse-graining”; contraposed
to this is the derivation of thermodynamic time asymmetry via choice of time-
asymmetric equations of dynamics (the program of Prigogine and the Brus-
sels and Austin schools), sometimes called “extended dynamics” (Castagnino &
Gunzig 1998). A theorem from Lasota and Mackey (Lasota & Mackey 1985), as
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referenced in (Castagnino & Gunzig 1998) is supposed to render the controversy
moot, but since I do not fully appreciate the mathematics, I choose here the
more intuitively-tractable macrostate-microstate view to make my argument.
3.1 Phase Space
Every possible state of a system can be thought of as a point in an abstract
space having as many dimensions as there are degrees of freedom for the system
in all its detail. For example, in a simple mechanical system comprising four
objects, the degrees of freedom might be considered to be the positions and
the momenta of the four objects. Each object’s position could be specified by
three spatial coordinates, and likewise each object’s momentum vector could
be specified by three spatial components. So there would be 4 · (3 + 3) = 24
degrees of freedom for this mechanical system of three objects, and it could
be represented by a point in an abstract space of 24 dimensions. In general
the state of such a system of N objects can thus be thought of as a point in
6N -dimensional space. This is the phase space of the system.
Regarding the state of a system, or of the universe as a whole, as a point in
phase space, change is thought of as movement of the point in phase space. The
probabilistic questions of what state the system is likely to be in, or what state
it is likely to change to, become abstract spatial questions about the proximity
and sizes of regions in phase space.
3.2 Macrostate as a region of phase space
A macrostate may be regarded as a certain region (volume) in phase space, the
interior points of which are the microstates that are consistent with the param-
eter values that define that macrostate. In these terms, Boltzmann expressed
entropy SB in terms of number of microstates W :
SB = k lnW (1)
where k is Boltzmann’s constant. Entropy, then, is associated with a measure
(generalized volume) of phase space (Campbell 1965). Increasing entropy, being
associated with increasing probability, might therefore be understood in terms
of the path of a point in phase space, from one macrostate region to another
macrostate region of larger volume.
The distribution of microstates associated with a given macrostate is ex-
pected, by the second law of thermodynamics, to evolve in such a way that its
“envelope” occupies a larger and larger phase-space volume as time goes on.
The initial phase-space volume of the distribution is not to be thought of as
expanding, but rather as becoming more convoluted, as it were (Penrose 1989),
like dye stirred into a liquid, so as to occupy a larger phase-space volume in
terms of the initial macrostate parameters. An equivalent statement of the sec-
ond law of thermodynamics is that observed macrostates of lesser phase-space
volume (i.e. less probable macrostates) tend to go over into macrostates of
greater phase-space volume (i.e. more probable macrostates).
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On the other hand, time-symmetry of dynamical laws means that the formu-
las describing the evolution of states (microstates) are invertible; this one-to-one
correspondence between successive states implies that the phase-space volume
of a given distribution does not change through time (in accordance with the
Liouville theorem). This seems to be the crux of controversy regarding the ob-
jective vs. subjective nature of entropy: if entropy is phase-space space volume,
and this volume doesn’t change for a distribution of states evolving through
time, then it would seem that there can be no objective increase in entropy.
But in fact for any given macrostate parameters, the overwhelming majority of
microstates consistent with those macrostate parameters evolve to microstates
lying outside the originally-defined macrostate region. Why? “Because that’s
where the space is.”
4 Prediction vs. retrodiction
We are accustomed to thinking that the past is known, whereas the future is
unknown. But surprisingly, if the past is not recorded, the opposite is more
nearly true: it is easier to predict from a given macrostate into the future, than
to retrodict from a given macrostate into the past. For if past macrostates
pass into larger future macrostates (the second law), while past distributions
maintain their phase-space volume into the future (the Liouville theorem), then
the correspondence between macrostates from past to future must not be one-
to-one; there must be convergence of macrostates forward in time, specifically
toward a macrostate of equilibrium, and divergence of macrostates backward
in time. Therefore macrostate prediction is easier than macrostate retrodic-
tion: given a present macrostate, we see that any number of prior macrostates
(of lesser phase-space volume) could have evolved into the present macrostate,
whereas the present macrostate (along with, perhaps, any number of distinct
macrostates) can be expected, by the second law, to evolve into the same pos-
terior macrostate of larger phase-space volume. Hence macrostate prediction is
easier than macrostate retrodiction insofar as the second law of thermodynam-
ics guarantees that macrostates go over into larger-volume macrostates, even
as the associated microstate distributions maintain their phase-space volume as
they evolve and their envelopes spread out into larger macrostates. However,
more will be said about this in connection with Maximum Entropy Production
and probability slopes.
Given a particular microstate on the other hand, prediction and retrodiction
are on equal footing as they employ the same time-symmetric dynamical laws;
thus if one had detailed knowledge of molecular positions and momenta after
an irreversible process had occurred (such as when a glass of water falls from a
table, breaks, and spills its contents), one could “run the movie backward” to
reconstruct the history, the information being present implicitly in the correla-
tions of microscopic detail. That is to say, the “randomized” microstate after
the spill is actually quite unique when regarded in all its detail, even though it
appears to be a member of a much larger class, in terms of macrostate param-
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eters, than it had been before the spill. A complete description of the latter
microstate would be extremely lengthy, except that certain correlations would
be discovered which would allow this microstate to be summarized, in effect, as
“that state resulting from the fall of a glass from a table”.
The foregoing illustrates that information entropy and thermodynamic en-
tropy are not identical and do not change with time in the same way. In-
formation entropy is a concept which can be applicable to an individual sys-
tem, in accordance with algorithmic information theory (Kolmogorov 1968).
But thermodynamic entropy implicitly applies to distributions of systems, as
mentioned previously in connection with Gibbs’ work in statistical mechanics
(Gibbs 1902). Equivalently, one might subdivide a single system into subsystems
and observe the second law of thermodynamics operating as a “flow of entropy”
(Haggerty 1974), down a hierarchy of scale, or from velocity coordinates to spa-
tial coordinates. One can be confident, by the second law of thermodynamics,
that certain macrostate parameters of the system, being statistical averages, will
change with time in a way which reflects a larger number of possible microstates
consistent with the latter macrostate. But the number of parameters required
to specify the macrostate need not change. So any increase in thermodynamic
entropy is not reflected in any increase in information entropy of the macrostate
parameters.
An equivalent expression of the second law of thermodynamics, due to Pen-
rose, is that systems that have been separated in the past are uncorrelated.
Conversely, after “randomizing” interactions, systems remain correlated. Pri-
gogine’s insight was that “irreversibility is a flow of correlations“ (Prigogine
1962). My interpretation of this is that correlations flow from the macrostate
scale to the microstate scale, but are conserved.
Thinking solely in terms of least-biased inference, given a present state, spec-
ified by some macrostate parameters, one would make the same estimate of past
macrostate as of future macrostate: one would expect an increase of entropy ei-
ther way.1 The resolution of this apparent paradox, according to Penrose, is that
the past was constrained, namely by a condition of exceedingly low entropy (or
high improbability) early in the history of our universe.2 In Penrose’s view, this
early state of our universe in fact explains the second law of thermodynamics,
if only by taking in its place an initial state of high improbability.
5 Information, entropy, and order
For the purpose of this paper, I would like to use the term spatial order to refer
to the improbability associated with low entropy. I acknowledge that many
authors would disagree with the identification of entropy with disorder, some
1Interpreted physically, this view also has th oddly provincial effect of making “now” an
uniquely low-entropy time.
2viz. near-zero Weyl tensor of space-time curvature, providing maximal distributed relative
“height” of mass, from which it could “fall”, forming stars, which would source the free energy
for wind, rain, life, etc.
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for example preferring to identify entropy with “freedom” (Brissaud 2005), but
I choose the word “order” over the word “negentropy” because linguistically it
better fits a property, or a disposition, than does the word “negentropy”. Order,
as I propose to use the word, is a measure of disequilibrium, or of compactness
in phase space, in so far as a given state can be regarded as a member of a
relatively small macrostate class. In my preferred terminology, the algorithmic
information content of a highly ordered state would be relatively low.
Analogously, I would like to use the term “temporal order” to refer to the
improbability of a temporal sequence. For a sequence of high temporal order,
relatively few sequences would fit the “macro” description of the sequence, and
its algorithmic information content would likewise be low. I conjecture that
spatial order and temporal order are two aspects of the same thing, and that
from any observer’s point of view, they exhibit a reciprocal relation, as temporal
order induces spatial order (“The flow of energy through a system tends to
organize that system”,3 the “dissipative structures” of Prigogine, etc.), and
spatial order induces temporal order (The spontaneous organization of a system
tends to accommodate the flow of energy through that system: MEP (Paltridge
1979, Schneider & Kay 1994)).
Gibbs refined the Boltzmann expression of entropy in equation 1, to account
for the possibility that not all microstates be equally probable:
SG = −kB
∑
pi ln pi (2)
where kB is again Boltzmann’s constant, and the pi are members of a probability
distribution of microstates consistent with the macrostate.4
Shannon, working in the field of communications theory (Shannon 1948),
quantified the uncertainty US of a message yet to be received as:
US = −
∑
pi log2 pi (3)
where the pi comprise a probability distribution of possible messages. Clearly
equations 1 and 2 are isomorphic, being measures of the spread of distributions
of possibility, so by analogy Shannon ventured to call his measure of information
“entropy”.
Notwithstanding Shannon’s own warnings regarding careless use of such
terms as “information” and “entropy” (Shannon 1956), there is much disagree-
ment in the literature about their relation, in spite of such insights as that of
Landauer and Bennett relating the two (Bennett 1982). Not to confuse knowl-
edge with information, I accept the Shannon use of the term “information” to
refer to a measure of the capacity to inform, hence uncertainty. Noting the
mathematical isomorphism between Shannon’s information entropy and Gibbs’
thermodynamic entropy, some authors have attempted to construct second-law
analogies between biological “information” and thermodynamic entropy (Brooks
3Quote attributed to R. Buckminster Fuller.
4The negative sign appears because the microstate probabilities pi are normalized to∑
pi = 1, so all ln pi are negative.
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& Wiley 1988), while others have rejected information theory and constructed
their own definitions of information (Wicken 1980). In fact, Wicken’s definition
of “information”, based on improbability, is close to my proposed definition of
“order”.
I believe that disagreements about “information” and “entropy” have to do
with the question of how they change with time. The mathematical isomor-
phism can hardly be considered accidental, yet a strictly parallel second law
need not follow. On the contrary, it is enlightening to note the opposite arrows
of time, with respect to information entropy decrease vis-a`-vis thermodynamic
entropy increase with time: in any irreversible process of communication, infor-
mation entropy must decrease (Martin 2006). This is so because information is
a difference, a relational quantity, being a measure of the potential to inform.5
6 The arrow of time
The second law of thermodynamics is considered to be at once the most certain
of physical laws and also the most perplexing or intriguing in its implications,
as expressed variously by many eminent scientists and philosophers of science
(Einstein 1940, Eddington 1928, Prigogine 1980). Evidently its certainty is
accounted for by the fact that certainty itself is, in a sense, its subject; its
intrigue may be accounted for by the fact that it stands alone (almost6) among
the laws of dynamics as the one that essentially confirms the difference between
past and future and that accounts for any sensible change in the world.
A four-hundred-year tradition of scientific inquiry, expressed in equations of
dynamics that are time symmetric, and in relativity transformations that mix
time with space, has perhaps led away from an intuitive personal perspective
of time and toward a geometric perspective of space-time. The geometric per-
spective seems simpler and more objective, so that it is compelling to suppose
that our intuitive perspective of time, in relation to the world becoming what it
is, may be provincial and somewhat illusory. Yet the geometric perspective of
time as a dimension forces one to confront the question of why one direction in
this dimension should be different from another, or indeed, why any particular
value of this dimension’s coordinate (such as t = 0, or “now”, in the vernacular)
should be accorded any special status. (In other words, why do we have the
unequivocal sense of being centered at the present, if all of space-time has a
“geometric” existence?) Ilya Prigogine, who spent a lifetime studying nonequi-
librium thermodynamics and developing equations of extended dynamics that
break time-symmetry, was primarily motivated in his studies by an interest in
these questions of time (Prigogine 2003).
The second law of thermodynamics, or increasing entropy, is apparently not
the only arrow of time, as pointed out by Popper with the example of radiating
5As with other quantities of potential, like voltage, there is the confusing tendency to
assume an absolute ground, and to treat such quantities as absolute.
6Decay of the long-lived kaon particle appears as an unique time-asymmetric quantum-
mechanical process.
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waves (Popper 1956), but aside from the psychological sense of time, it seems to
provide the most pervasive objective evidence of irreversibility. In “The many
faces of irreversibility”, Denbigh argues that irreversibility (which I take to be
synonymous with time asymmetry) is a broader concept than that of entropy
increase, and that its essence seemsnning out”, or expansion in space, either
physical or abstract (Denbigh 1989). Why do things expand? “Because that’s
where the space is”?
7 MEP and MaxEnt
The ideas of non-equilibrium thermodynamics have found application in various
fields, notably biology and meteorology. Maximal or minimal principles of en-
ergy flow or entropy production in biology have been proposed by many authors
(Johnstone 1921, Lotka 1922, Schro¨dinger 1944, Hamilton 1977, Lovelock 1987,
Wicken 1987, Brooks & Wiley 1988, Schneider & Kay 1994, Salthe 2005); Pal-
tridge, among others, advanced the principle of Maximum Entropy Production
(MEP) in meteorological modeling (Paltridge 1979, Paltridge 2001).
MEP is the tendency for open systems far from equilibrium to respond to
imposed differences, or gradients, by evolving to a steady state in which the
production of entropy is maximized. The principle of MEP appears as a re-
generative combination of the effect of difference-induced flow in organizing a
system (“making a difference”), together with flow-induced organization en-
hancing the ability of the system to conduct the flow. If the principle is known
to be valid for a system, then it can be used (like the Le Chatelier - Braun prin-
ciple of chemistry, or indeed, like the second law of thermodynamics in general)
to predict averaged parameters of system behavior, without knowledge of the
system’s details.
The aim of the so-called “MaxEnt” information-theoretical formulation of
non-equilibrium statistical mechanics due to Jaynes is to represent most accu-
rately and fully the uncertainty about the state of a system, given the constraints
of all that is known about the system. Based on the Bayesian concept of prob-
ability as a measure of ignorance, rather than on the Monte Carlo concept of
probability as a sampling ratio, it is used to quantify the spread of possible
microstates, given only knowledge of the macrostate. It is considered by its ad-
vocates to be a very generally applicable principle of scientific inference, to be
used to arrive at a least-biased estimate of any unknown quantity, given some
limited knowledge of the system under observation.
Recently the MaxEnt method has been extended (Dewar 2003, Dewar 2004,
Dewar 2005) to estimate not just most likely states, but most-likely state-change
paths–i.e. system evolution. MEP as a thermodynamic principle describing sys-
tem evolution is thereby derived, along with other well-known physical principles
such as the Fluctuation Theorem, which quantifies the likelihood of so-called
“irreversible” processes actually proceeding in reverse.7 It has been almost a
7To wit, the fluctuation theorem can be expressed by p(στ )/p(−στ ) = exp(τστ /kB), where
στ is the entropy production over an irreversible path of duration τ , p(στ ) is the probability
11
century since Paul and Tatiana Ehrenfest published The Conceptual Founda-
tions of the Statistical Approach in Mechanics (Ehrenfest & Ehrenfest 1912),
which clarified certain points of disagreement; now the time seems ripe for a
reconciliation of divergent views on the nature of entropy and the second law
of thermodynamics. I suggest that this reconciliation might come about by the
recognition of probability, not as ignorance, and not as dice, but as a physical
motive.
8 Probability as topography
As described above, in the phase-space view of a system, its state is represented
as a single point. System evolution is then a sequence of points, and it may
be possible to visualize the second law of thermodynamics as the movement
of the point, representing the state of the system, into ever-larger macrostate
volumes. Even if “macrostate” and “entropy” have no absolute meaning until
we have specified the set of parameters which define the thermodynamic state of
the system (Denbigh & Denbigh 1985), it is nevertheless true that, regardless of
choice of macrostate parameters, according to the second law of thermodynamics
we should expect this movement, on average (i.e. except for “fluctuations”), to
proceed from smaller macrostate volumes to larger macrostate volumes.
If one then imagines macrostate volume inversely mapped to an “elevation”,
one obtains a surface topography on which system evolution is expected, by the
second law, to proceed “downhill”. This is admittedly nothing but a conceptual
device, lacking mathematical rigor. But it helps draw attention to the question
of why anything flows downhill, why a puddle spreads. What would the Dillinger
answer be? We might say that water flowing downhill responds to the physical
motive of gravitational force. But we don’t know what gravity is (though to
preserve the precept of local action we may say that it is curvature of space-
time); in fact flow of mass in response to a gravitational gradient is just the
same sort of second-law journey, downhill on the imagined phase-space topog-
raphy, as is flow of heat in response to a temperature gradient, there being more
opportunities for matter to be collected—greater probability for such states to
be realized—than for it to remain dispersed, just as there are more ways for a
bunch of molecules of a given velocity distribution (i.e. average temperature)
to be spatially dispersed than to be spatially segregated by velocity.
This is admittedly a difficult point because, as reflected in the Gibbs re-
finement of the Boltzmann formula for entropy (and analogously in Shannon’s
refinement of Hartley’s measure of information,8 the probability associated with
a given macrostate depends not only on the number of microstates consistent
of a system following the irreversible phase-space path, p(−στ ) the probability of a system
following the reverse path, and kB is Boltzmann’s constant.
8The Hartley measure of information, or uncertainty, is IH = lnA, where A is the number
of possible outcomes. Like the Boltzmann entropy, which is simply proportional to the number
of microstates, Hartley information does not take into account differing relative probabilities
of particular outcomes.
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with the macrostate, but also on their individual probabilities. The individ-
ual probabilities in turn are presumably functions of their energy distributions.
There is of course energy in gravitational potential (collective difference in lo-
cation of mass). If gravity is taken to be curvature of space-time, then the
assertion that there are more opportunities for matter to be collected than for
it to remain dispersed is equivalent to the statement that there are more ways
for space-time to be “wrinkled” than for it to be flat.
Continuing with the conceptual device of probability topography derived
from phase space, one can then visualize MEP as “flow”, not just downhill, but
down the steepest gradient. Of course this is what one might expect intuitively.
I expect that the question of whether it holds universally amounts to the ques-
tion of how probability slope depends on choice of macrostate parameters. The
question of retrodiction may also be recast in terms of finding the steepest prob-
ability gradient back—minimum (negative) entropy production in the reverse
time direction. The work of Dewar (Dewar 2003, Dewar 2005) puts these in-
tuitive notions on firmer mathematical ground. More importantly, I think, the
work bridges the gap between phenomenological understanding of MEP and
epistemological understanding of MaxEnt, opening the door to acceptance of
probability as a fundamental physical motive.
It is not the intent of this letter to discuss the relative reality of mental mod-
els, or maps, on the one hand, and the physical world, on the other. Rather the
intent is to suggest the consideration of “probability”—extent of possibility in
phase space—as a fundament of the physics of change and spatial differentiation
in our model, rather than as a computational tool or as “metadata”.
9 Opportunity and necessity
It has been assumed that probability must be interpreted either “objectively” as
a measure of ratios of outcomes, or “subjectively” as a measure of observers’ ig-
norance (Jaynes 1957, Dewar 2004). I claim that there is another interpretation
of probability, outside this dichotomy: probability may be interpreted as a mea-
sure of possibility, or of opportunity for realization. Some have remarked that
Monod’s work Le hasard et la nece´ssite´ (Chance and Necessity) (Monod 1970)
was written “in the gloomiest of existential traditions” (Wicken 1987). I suspect
that profound questions about origins and destinations—reasons for being—
were mistaken for a profound sense of estrangement. Monod’s awareness of
kinship with all life, and with nature, is amply apparent; if there was a sense of
estrangement it might have been with the odd circumstance in which we find
ourselves, caught between science’s presumption of causal origins and religion’s
assumption of purposive destiny. How does one interpret hasard, or “chance”?
Is the sense that of risk? of randomness? More likely it is that of fortune, or of
possibility. This is the sense of probability as a physical motive.
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10 Reciprocal relations
The beginning of thermodynamics is generally taken to be Carnot’s observa-
tion that a difference of temperature can produce motive force. The practical
realization of this principle is of course the heat engine (the generic term for
such as the steam engine and internal-combustion engine), where a difference
in the form of chemical potential is first discharged via combustion in order to
generate the temperature difference from which motive force can be produced.
Conversely, motive force can produce a temperature difference, practically in
the form of a heat pump, or refrigerator.
Over a century after Carnot, in an early foray into nonequilibrium thermo-
dynamics, Onsager (Onsager 1931) explained the reciprocal relations that are
observed between pairs of difference (potential) and flow, such as the Peltier ef-
fect (whereby an electric current develops a temperature difference) vis-a`-vis the
Seebeck effect (whereby a heat flow develops an electrical potential). The work
of Prigogine and the Brussels and Austin schools in non-equilibrium thermody-
namics carried on to explore the many implications of the reciprocal relations
between differences and flows. The generative, as well as the dissipative, aspect
of the second law of thermodynamics is now more generally recognized (see, for
example, (Schneider & Sagan 2005)).
All these discoveries in non-equilibrium thermodynamics lead one to venture
the view that, in the big picture, “order” and its concomitant “disordering”
comprise a feedback loop, a self-determining spiral cascade of differences and
flows which change form but which may exhibit “strange loopiness”, to borrow
Hofstadter’s term (Hofstadter 1979), in that they refer back to themselves by
inclusion. By analogy to Onsager’s specific reciprocal relations, generic “order”
may behave as a sort of “auto-reciprocal” singleton, insofar as any “dissipative
structure” resulting from flow also degrades, conversely generating another flow.
Order (as I’ve presumed to use the word both spatially and temporally) is nec-
essarily self referential in space-time, exhibiting regenerative, self-propagating
(even if self-damping, “senescent”) effects. Order dissipates, but dissipation
orders, and this holds both spatially and temporally.
11 Spatio-temporal order
I have suggested that spatial order and temporal order are two aspects of the
same thing. In the geometric model of space-time, spatial order (improbability
of state) and temporal order (improbability of evolution) determine each other,
in the manner (if the reader will indulge a sloppy analogy) of the electric field
and the magnetic field, or of a Fourier pair such as position and momentum.
This “static”, geometric conception of unified spatio-temporal order is an at-
tempt to integrate the insights of special relativity9 into the investigation of
9Special relativity pertains to the apparent equivalence of uniformly-moving and non-
moving frames of reference, so that the laws of physics should be covariant with respect to a
Lorenz transformation, implying the non-independence of space and time. General relativity
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the second law of thermodynamics and the consideration of probability as a
physical motive. It follows the tradition of seeking simplification by assuming
invariance—requiring the proposed concept of order not to depend essentially
on point of view. Hence the notion that time and space must figure similarly
with regard to the structure of spatio-temporal order.
The proposed conceptual model of spatio-temporal order explicitly extends
in both space and time, since the proposed definitions of spatial order and of
temporal order are based on a notion of improbability of state or of evolutionary
sequence, which makes sense only for some sort of distribution or sequence that
is one of a class of possibilities. A temporal cross-section of the model would be
an illustration of the second law of thermodynamics, but the real attraction of
the model would be in relating the spatial and temporal aspects of order, and
in providing a more complete perspective on the asymmetry of time.
This spatio-temporal order must exhibit a “twist”, or “handedness”, to re-
flect the fact that (as far as the evolution of order is concerned) time has an “ar-
row”. But if the model is at all viable, and unless its mathematical description
should involve non-invertible functions, it would imply that knowledge of local
structure of a region (around “here” and “now”, for example) should allow ex-
trapolation from here-now in all spatio-temporal directions, as hinted previously
in the suggestion of a minimum entropy production principle for retrodiction of
macrostate. One might expect that the current macrostate was arrived at by
the most unlikely evolution, from the most unlikely prior macrostate, such that
both are consistent with the model as a whole.
12 Conclusion
The main point of this communication is to argue that probability should be con-
sidered to be a fundamental physical motive, sufficient unto itself for explaining
change. Some seventy five years of work in non-equilibrium thermodynamics, re-
vealing the constructive aspect of the second law of thermodynamics, together
with relatively recent progress substantiating the connections between infor-
mation theory (probability) and thermodynamics, lead to this opportunity to
entertain a new conceptual basis for understanding systems and their evolution,
for posing questions and formulating hypotheses.
I’ve tried to substantiate the proposed new view of probability by way of
a topological model of phase-space evolution, in which entropy increases with
progress “downhill”, and MEP is flow in the steepest direction. I’ve assumed
a definition of “order” in terms of improbabilityrelatively small macrostate vol-
umeand proposed an integration of “spatial order” and “temporal order” con-
cepts. It is hoped that the second law of thermodynamics would then be seen
as a partial description of the structure of spatiotemporal order, and that the
structure of spatio-temporal order would afford further insight into time asym-
metry.
pertains to the apparent equivalence of gravitation and acceleration.
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Questions that must be addressed include: How, exactly, is spatial order
to be quantified? How is temporal order to be quantified? How can they be
made commensurable? What, then, is the effect of a Lorentz transformation on
the measure of order? If the proposed probability topography of phase space
can be clearly defined, how will its slope depend on the choice of macrostate
parameters?
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